By Folake Shakirah Lawal

In May 2026, I shared my views on the Nigeria-Morocco Gas Pipeline with David Whitehouse for a Petroleum Economist feature examining reports that a framework agreement could be signed before the end of the year. His article distilled a range of perspectives on the project. What follows are my fuller reflections on the pipeline, its opportunities, risks, financing challenges, and long-term implications for Africa and Europe.

Read full article here: Petroleum Economist.

The project: what is the AAGP?

The African Atlantic Gas Pipeline, commonly referred to as the Nigeria-Morocco Gas Pipeline, is a $25 billion transcontinental infrastructure project first announced in 2016 as a bilateral initiative between Nigeria and Morocco. The pipeline is designed to deliver up to 30 billion cubic metres of gas annually.

At approximately 6,900 kilometres, predominantly offshore along the West African Atlantic coastline, it would be the longest offshore gas pipeline in the world and the second longest gas pipeline, behind China’s West-East Gas Pipeline.

The pipeline would pass through more than a dozen African countries before connecting to the existing Maghreb-Europe Gas Pipeline in Morocco, and from there into Spain and the broader European gas network. The project is expected to be carried out in standalone phases: the northern spine from Morocco to Senegal, the southern spine extending WAGP from Ghana to Côte d’Ivoire, and the central link connecting Côte d’Ivoire to Senegal.

The Nigeria-Morocco Gas Pipeline is one of the most ambitious energy infrastructure projects ever proposed on the continent, aimed at connecting Africa’s abundant natural gas resources to European markets seeking supply diversification.

But beyond the headlines, the key question is not how large the project is. It is whether the pipeline can realistically deliver on its promise of transforming regional energy integration and connecting African gas resources to European markets.

Nigeria and gas: a strategic shift that has been building for years

Nigeria is fundamentally more a gas province than an oil province. With over 210 TCF of proven gas reserves, the highest in Africa, the resource base has never been the problem. The problem has historically been the gap between what is in the ground and what gets commercialised. For decades, gas was treated as a nuisance byproduct of oil production and routinely flared. The thinking has shifted. Gas is now viewed as a transition fuel and the fuel of the future. And you can see that shift playing out in how policy has evolved, each framework more strategic, more integrated and more ambitious than the last.

The previous administration designated 2021 to 2030 as the “Decade of Gas”, committing to accelerate gas development, infrastructure, and utilisation across the economy. In January 2026, NNPC launched the Nigeria Gas Master Plan 2026 (NGMP 2026).

Unlike earlier frameworks, which were largely focused on scaling production, NGMP 2026 covers the entire value chain: upstream development, midstream infrastructure, domestic distribution, industrial utilisation, LNG exports, and regional pipeline integration through projects like the AAGP and the Trans-Saharan pipeline. The government has also introduced gas-specific fiscal incentives, particularly targeting non-associated gas development. Nigeria currently has roughly a 50-50 split of associated and non-associated gas, but the government is pushing for more dedicated NAG exploration and production.

And critically, the strategy is no longer export only. It’s a two-way strategy. Nigeria aims to strengthen its position as a leading LNG exporter, and cross-border pipelines remain important. However, there is now a much stronger emphasis on domestic utilisation through gas-to-power, LPG expansion, petrochemicals, industrial feedstock, fertiliser, industrialisation, and wider gas-based industries.

The goal is increasingly to use gas not just as an export commodity, but as a long-term economic development tool, both domestically and regionally.

The Nigeria-Morocco pipeline sits within that broader logic. It is the export dimension of a domestic gas strategy that is finally starting to look like a coherent whole.

Financing: structurally smart, but bankability is the real test

At $25 billion, the AAGP is one of the most capital-intensive infrastructure projects ever proposed on the African continent. The sheer scale presents a real financing challenge. But what Nigeria and Morocco have done is structurally smart.

Rather than 13 governments attempting to raise money directly, they are establishing a dedicated joint special-purpose vehicle between NNPC and ONHYM to lead execution, financing, and construction. A project company sitting between the sovereigns and the capital markets is the right vehicle.

The foundational equity split between the two companies is expected to be roughly 50-50, with open access for other ECOWAS NOCs to buy equity stakes for their respective geographic segments. On the debt side, which is expected to account for more than 50% of total funding, they are targeting a diverse creditor base: the European Investment Bank, the Islamic Development Bank, the OPEC Fund, with the UAE indicating interest alongside. ONHYM, Morocco’s state-owned national agency, is also actively courting US institutions, including the US Development Finance Corporation.

But interest is not commitment. And that distinction is where the real test lies.

Every DFI and sovereign wealth fund in that creditor pool will require some guarantee via bankable take-or-pay offtake agreements before they commit. They need to know the project can service the debt. Until European buyers sign long-term gas sales and purchase agreements, financiers will remain interested in principle but uncommitted.

It is the classic chicken-and-egg problem.

There is also a related supply question: the northern segment seeks gas from Mauritania and Senegal, but how firm are those commitments, and are the volumes sufficient to guarantee the uninterrupted flow that justifies the investment?

What genuinely improves the odds is the modular structure. Each standalone segment can secure its own financing, sign its own offtake agreements, and reach FID independently. You are not trying to close a single $25 billion decision.

The northern network, targeting 2031 and connecting Morocco to Mauritania and Senegal, has the strongest case for financing first. It is shorter, involves fewer sovereigns, sits closer to European offtake markets, and could serve Morocco’s own domestic demand and longer-term hydrogen export ambitions. If that segment delivers, it builds the credibility needed to unlock financing for the rest.

The real question is not whether the project is financeable. It is whether it can secure financing within the timeframe needed to avoid cost overruns and capitalise on the current window of European demand for African gas.

European offtake: the window is open, but the work is still Africa’s to do

The Middle East crisis, coming on top of the Russia-Ukraine energy shock, has fundamentally changed how European governments and utilities view supply security.

Europe has faced back-to-back supply shocks from different directions. The broader issue now is not simply price; it is security. And security increasingly means diversification. Diversification of suppliers, diversification of energy sources.

This does not mean Europe will become dependent on African gas the way it was on Russian gas. European policy is deliberately structured to prevent single-source dependency. The diversification strategy spans renewables, LNG imports, pipeline gas, storage expansion, and domestic energy transition. African gas, including the AAGP, fits into that portfolio logic. It offers geographic proximity, significant untapped reserves, and supply diversity.

And notably, the pipeline connects directly into existing infrastructure: from Tangier it links to the Maghreb-Europe Gas Pipeline, which already connects Morocco to Spain and the broader European network. The last mile exists.

But the demand signal is not a signed contract. Europe has become far more cautious about overdependence on any single source. Securing long-term offtake agreements will still depend on economics, pricing competitiveness, infrastructure reliability, and confidence in consistent supply.

Africa cannot point to the geopolitical moment and expect the contracts to follow. That work still has to be done.

Risk: the geopolitical coordination problem cannot be fully engineered away

The technical challenges are significant, but they are not the ones most likely to make or break the project. Even with proven technology for long-distance offshore pipelines, the length alone increases construction complexity, maintenance requirements, operational coordination, and costs significantly.

The modular structure, breaking the project into standalone segments, provides some mitigation, allowing each phase to be managed and financed independently.

The more serious risks are geopolitical and security-related.

The pipeline crosses multiple jurisdictions with very different political systems, regulatory environments, security conditions, and economic priorities. We have already seen shifting regional dynamics in West Africa, including tensions within ECOWAS and changing relationships between some Sahel states and their regional partners.

That creates a complicated coordination environment, across governments, regulators, security institutions, and commercial partners over many years. And the political risk profile is uneven across the route.

The predominantly offshore routing does provide some protection against onshore pipeline vandalism. But offshore sections are not without risk; piracy and maritime insecurity remain real considerations.

And because the system is so interconnected, disruption in one section or one transit country can affect the wider network. That is a structural vulnerability at this scale that cannot be fully engineered away.

So, while the technical challenges are significant, the long-term geopolitical coordination risk is probably the harder problem to manage.

Timescale and the honest verdict

Africa has a history of megaproject delays.

The Dangote refinery is instructive: construction began in 2013 with a $9 billion estimate and a three-to-four year timeline. It commenced operations in January 2024, a decade later, at a final cost of approximately $20 billion.

The drivers are familiar: financing constraints, political transitions, regulatory delays, and security risk. For a pipeline crossing more than a dozen countries, those risks are multiplied significantly.

Whether the AAGP will succeed or not remains to be seen. What can be assessed is where the project stands, what progress has been made, and what remains unresolved.

Feasibility studies are completed. Parts of the environmental impact assessments are finalised. National partnerships have expanded, including the recent addition of Togo’s SOTOGAZ. A governance architecture is taking shape: a JV project company to be headquartered in Morocco and a High Authority in Nigeria. These are important milestones.

But the project is still far from financial closure. There is no FID. Questions around financing, commercial structure, and long-term supply and offtake commitments remain unresolved.

The 2031 target for the northern phase is five years away. Is that feasible without FID and committed funding today? Highly unlikely.

The more practical frame is phase by phase: the northern spine, the southern spine, and the central link. Whether specific sections reach financing, construction, and operational milestones successfully is the right measure of progress.

The strategic environment is more supportive now than at any point in this project’s history. Higher hydrocarbon revenues have improved the fiscal position of producing countries. Europe’s focus on energy security has strengthened the strategic case for African gas infrastructure.

Gas is not going away; it is the transition fuel the world needs as it balances energy security, industrial growth, and decarbonisation.

An opportunity beyond gas

There is also a longer-term strategic dimension. Once built, this corridor could position Morocco as an energy bridge between Africa and Europe. Not just for natural gas, but potentially for future hydrogen trade, irrespective of colour; blue, green, or otherwise. Of course, natural gas pipelines are not automatically hydrogen-ready. Repurposing requires technical adaptation, including material upgrades to manage hydrogen embrittlement and blending constraints that currently limit hydrogen content to around 20% in existing infrastructure. But the corridor, once established, provides a foundation that could support that vision with the right investment. Europe will need decarbonised energy at scale. West Africa has the resource base to produce it. Will the infrastructure get built in time to be part of that future?

The project is strategically important and technically possible. Whether it succeeds will ultimately depend less on ambition — there has never been a shortage of that — and more on financing discipline, long-term political coordination, commercial viability, and execution consistency across many governments and many years.

The opportunity exists today because European energy security concerns, African gas resources, and political momentum are aligned. The question is whether financing and execution can move fast enough before that alignment changes.